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Introduction
“Countries need the latitude to impose capital controls that meet their par-
ticular needs, and it is a relief to see that they are finally getting it after a long 
period of debilitating neoliberal ideology.”1
 Ilene Grabel and Ha-Joon Chang 
Over the past two decades, the role of entrepreneurship in driving economic 
growth has become an important research topic in economics, and govern-
ments around the world have enacted policies to enable entrepreneurship and 
spur innovation. With metrics such as the World Bank’s Doing Business report 
highlighting a country’s ease of starting (and closing) a business, countries 
have increasingly focused on improving their investment climate as a way 
to foster entrepreneurship; this has been done in tandem with traditional “in-
novation” policies such as investment in research and development (R&D), 
supporting incubators and innovation clusters, and investing in education and 
human capital development.  
However, a rising wave of financial protectionism threatens to derail the 
progress made in improving business entry in emerging markets. As the quote 
above shows, there is an accelerating trend in favor of capital controls that be-
gan with the collapse of the Icelandic economy in 2008. The use of controls in 
Iceland, explicitly supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a way 
to stem capital flight, has given intellectual cover for policymakers, and emerg-
ing markets throughout the world have contemplated or implemented controls: 
• In March 2009, Ukraine ordered banks to buy and sell its currency at 
a rate no weaker than a floor policymakers set each day (with the first 
day’s floor much higher than the prevailing market rate). This was done 
ostensibly to prevent the rapid depreciation of the currency from turning 
into a rout.
• Brazil, which saw its currency appreciate by 36% against the US Dollar in 
1/  From their article, “Why Capital Controls Are Not All Bad,” Financial Times, October 25, 2010.
2009, imposed a 2% tax in October 2009 on money entering the country 
exclusively for investing in equities and fixed income instruments, dou-
bling the tax to 4% in October 2010. 
• Also in late 2009, Taiwan banned foreigners from putting money into 
time deposits.2 
• Thailand, following in the footsteps of Chile in the 1990s, enacted a 30% 
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) in December 2006 on all new 
inflows. Much as in Taiwan, a further 15% tax on foreigners holding Thai 
government and state-owned bonds enacted in October 2010 was called 
a “withholding tax.”
Several other countries across the development spectrum, from Indone-
sia to South Korea, have also increased the regulations and rules regarding 
2/  Interestingly, perhaps knowing what the term “capital controls” means to the market, the head of the Financial 
Supervisory Commission’s Foreign Exchange Department publicly stated, “We are not imposing any capital con-
trol, at least for now… [investors] should buy stocks or bonds… rather than parking the money in time deposits.” 
Spencer Lin, quoted in “Taiwan Regulator Moves to Curb ‘Hot Money”,” Agence France Presse, November 10, 
2009, available on-line at: http://news.malaysia.msn.com/business/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3699482.
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investment. Indeed, even as some authors claim that “debilitating neoliberal 
ideology” removed the leverage for capital controls in emerging markets, Fig-
ure 1 shows that this actually has not been the case; a majority of countries 
have retained some form of control, even through the supposed free-wheeling 
1990s, and some have even seen their economic conditions improve while 
continuing to have controls. 
While a growing amount of economic evidence has emerged that capital 
controls as a tool may both be ineffective for many of their stated purpos-
es, there has been little examination of their long-term effects that can harm 
rather than help entrepreneurship in emerging markets. The purpose of this 
paper is to fill this gap and examine capital controls in both a historical and re-
cent context, ascertaining their possible effect on firms and entrepreneurship 
in emerging markets in coming years. What will the impact be on emerging 
markets and firms in developing countries if capital controls continue to gain 
credibility? How has the rebirth of controls in the wake of the global financial 
crisis affected entrepreneurship in emerging markets?
This paper will proceed in the following manner: the following Section 
will define capital controls and examine how they can affect entrepreneurship 
in theory and in practice (including examining the case studies of Chile and 
Malaysia). Section II will introduce new evidence and analysis on the broader 
effects of controls at the microeconomic level, updating previous work to 
include the effects of controls during the global financial crisis. Finally, Sec-
tion III will conclude with some thoughts about the future of capital mobility 
and the prospects for entrepreneurship in an increasingly protectionist world.
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“In 1997-98, the words ‘capital controls’ were forbidden and stigmatized. 
Now the problem of capital is so systematic and huge globally, it has now 
become universally acceptable to have a certain type of temporary capital 
controls.”3 
World Bank Managing Director Sri Mulyani 
What exaCtly is a “Capital Control”?
In order to ascertain the effects of capital controls on entrepreneurship, the first 
issue we run up against is definitional. In reality, the term “capital controls” 
refers to not just one policy or administrative lever, but to a series of different 
mechanisms that range from the minor to the draconian, all with the goal of 
slowing (or halting) capital movements into or out of a country. Diverse in their 
conception as well as their execution, the various controls can be grouped as 
either “administrative,” or direct controls, and “transaction-based,” or indirect 
3/  Quoted in “Asia May Need Capital Controls,” the Jakarta Post, November 11, 2010, available on-line at: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/11/10/asia-may-need-capital-controls-sri-mulyani.html.
TAbLE 1/ TypES OF CApITAL CONTROLS 
Administrative transaction-based
Threshold investment requirements Non-interest bearing reserve requirements
Approval procedure required for cross-border 
transactions
Taxes on portfolio flows (e.g. a Tobin Tax)
Quantitatitve limits and/or quotas on investment Discriminatory and disparate taxes on income 
resulting from foreign assets
Outright prohibition of repatriation or non-convert-
ible currency.
Credit rating requirements for borrowing abroad
Time requirements, including stipulations that 
incoming funds have to stay in the country for a 
certain amount of time
Multiple exchange rate systems
Increased and discriminatory reporting require-
ments
Source: based on information from Ariyoshi et. al (2000)
TAbLE 2/ TARGETING OF CONTROLS
Capital Flow targeted
Inflows outflows
p
u
rp
o
se
 o
f 
C
o
n
tr
o
l Correct a Balance of Payments Surplus Generate Revenue/Finance a War Effort
Prevent Potentially Volatile Inflows Financial Repression/Credit Allocation
Prevent Financial Destabilization Correct a Balance of Payments Deficit
Prevent Real Appreciation Preserve Savings for Domestic Use
Restrict Foreign Ownership of Domestic Assets Protect Domestic Financial Firms
Protect Domestic Financial Firms
Source: Neely (1999)
controls, depending on how they are implemented (see Table 1).4 More impor-
tantly, the differing instruments used to distort capital flows are not of uniform 
stringency, and the by-no-means–exhaustive list shown in Table 1 shows a wide 
variation in terms of pressure and compliance that capital controls can require.
Similarly, while these various instruments work at different levels of 
implementation, they also have different intended effects and are targeted at 
different types of capital movements. Table 2, based on work done by Chris-
topher J. Neely of the St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1999, 
shows what he identifies as the ten most common reasons for capital controls, 
broken down by the type of capital flow that they target (inflows or outflows). 
effeCts of Controls on entrepreneur-
ship: the theory
As this brief discussion shows, the manner in which controls are applied and 
the areas they target are mostly macroeconomic in nature, with effects on indi-
vidual firms often subsumed as a second- or third-order effect (i.e. by creating 
stability and protecting financial sector institutions, firms in the real economy 
4/  In the literature, the term “market-based” is also utilized but has been eschewed in favor of “transaction-
based” so as to differentiate between the actual channels in which implementation is effected. In the author’s view, 
the term “market-based” is also somewhat misleading, as all capital controls are meant to distort the market; the 
term “transaction-based” thus more completely captures the fact that certain controls are meant to increase transac-
tion costs.
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will benefit). However, a more in-depth look at capital controls highlights their 
potentially deleterious effects for entrepreneurship.
In one sense, the theory on the effects of capital controls on firms is fairly 
clear: any regulations that make it more difficult to obtain financing or allow 
investment in a country should inhibit entrepreneurship and firm expansion5. 
As two authors exploring the effect of controls in Chile note, theories of cor-
porate finance also formalize this idea in an investment-specific context:
…in the absence of financial restrictions and corporate agency problems, 
firm investment depends exclusively on the (marginal) value of the firm rela-
tive to its replacement value. However, to the extent that the firm faces con-
straints on external financing, its investment will be determined by its internal 
resources, namely, retained cash earnings.6 
Researchers at the IMF expand on this point, noting that “capital controls can 
substantially limit access to, and raise the cost of, foreign currency debt, especially 
for firms without foreign currency revenues.” 7 This is an important fact, for many 
developing countries have undeveloped capital markets (indeed, many countries 
are developing precisely because of the low pool of savings and financial interme-
diation for the private sector to draw upon), and thus in order to expand need to tap 
foreign funding; capital controls would thus inhibit this flow of finance. Moreover, 
limited access to finance would also impact firms disparately, as larger firms tend 
to have an easier time securing bank lending (or utilizing internal funds), and in-
deed, researchers have found that countries with less capital account restrictions 
tend to have more small firms than those that do not. 8
Beyond the direct investment effects, instituting discretionary controls and 
going through cycles of enacting and then repealing them engenders the exact type 
of volatility and uncertain expectations that controls claim to redress.9 A start-stop 
approach to capital flows can scare investors away over the longer-term, as well as 
leave domestic firms uncertain about the structure of their financing if they borrow 
internationally. The uncertainty about capital account liberalization can also drive 
up the risk premium for doing business in a particular country, making the cost of 
capital (when it is available) more expensive and dampening borrowing. Thus, 
5/  Interestingly, some authors note that these restraints must actually be binding to influence financing. As Edi-
son and Warnock (2003) discover, capital inflows only increase after a relaxation of capital controls that are rigidly 
enforced and monitored. Controls that are more observed in the breach than in the practice thus are not much of 
controls at all.
6/  See Gallego and Loayza (2000).
7/  Prati, Schindler, and Valenzuela (2009).
8/  Alfaro and Charlton (2008).
9/  This is a major point that proponents of capital controls argue – that controls bring stability. Authors such as 
Dani Rodrik have noted that high capital mobility can increase the likelihood of financial crises, which thus in turn 
reduces entrepreneurship.
with policymakers always having the lever of controls available, there is a real 
threat that the business environment suffers due to volatility, leading to less future 
investment and a real lower standard of living in the country as a whole.
Another area theoretically where controls would harm firms in the host 
country is in diffusion of technology. An early point made in the debate on 
capital account liberalization noted that investment, especially in the form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), allows for a transfer of technology and know-
ledge (meaning emerging market firms do not have to re-invent the wheel). 
While controls are normally designed to only target short-term or portfolio 
flows, the effect they can have is to slow all forms of investment, thus making 
it less likely that long-term investors will enter the country. However, some 
have argued that this may be a good thing in terms of fostering home-country 
entrepreneurship; according to research done in the 1980s, international capi-
tal flows, and in particular FDI, can lead to a crowding out of the domestic 
entrepreneurial class as foreign firms come to dominate. 10
Finally, from a public choice perspective, the creation of capital controls 
also imposes regulatory burdens on firms that feed uncertainty. In particular, 
direct administrative controls such as foreign investment approval processes can 
be highly discretionary, fostering uncertainty amongst investors, as it results in 
the political allocation of capital rather than market-based allocation. This can 
also lead to rent-seeking opportunities and corruption, especially at lower (and 
lower-paid) levels, where applications must typically be lodged (empirically, 
Dreher and Siemers (2005) have shown that this is the case, noting that higher 
corruption is associated with more restrictions on the capital account). 
This concentration of power to “pick winners” also wastes the time of inves-
tors and firms seeking capital, as the burden of firms means they must invest more 
time on succeeding in the process of investment approval than in the investment 
itself.  This is, of course, if firms actually decide to go the legal route; studies done 
on both developing and developed country firms show a myriad of ways how 
businesses avoid capital controls. An OECD catalogue of some of the measures 
business do to circumvent controls includes: falsification of invoices in trading, 
leads and lags in paperwork, substitution of exempted flows with restricted flows, 
and illegal methods (such as bribery and smuggling).11  Beyond those methods, 
even financial instruments that are legal under a control regime such as derivatives 
have been utilized to circumvent capital controls – and the longer the controls are 
in place, the better the private sector gets at avoiding them. 12
10/  See Grossman (1984) for a fuller explanation.
11/  Blondal and Christiansen (1999) provide a fuller listing of ways that firms use to circumvent controls.
12/  See especially Garber (1998).
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effeCts of Controls on entrepreneur-
ship: the evidenCe thus far
Examining the effects of capital controls on entrepreneurship is a difficult 
task, as it is often hard to disentangle the effects of the controls them-
selves from other macroeconomic variables and policies (indeed, countries 
that tend to institute controls have other distortions that can also exert 
an influence on firm entry). This issue is compounded by the fact that, as 
noted above, capital controls are generally instituted to influence macro-
economic variables; thus, much scholarship has been produced examining 
the efficacy of capital controls at a macroeconomic level, with little done 
on microeconomic effects.
A notable exception to this rule comes from a paper published by 
Harvard Business School, which stands out as an excellent cross-country 
examination of capital controls and entrepreneurship. Using a dataset for 
98 countries over three years (1999, 2004, and 2007), the paper finds that 
“countries with more relaxed capital controls (de jure integration) or re-
ceiving a higher volume of foreign capital (de facto integration) were on 
average more likely to experience greater entrepreneurship proxied by in-
creased activity among new and small firms.”13 Another study from the 
Swiss National Bank surveying 9,655 firms in transition countries shows 
that a lack of capital controls encourages small firms to borrow interna-
tionally in order to reach their financing needs.14  Other notable research 
has focused on specific countries, such as India, showing that capital con-
trols impede efficient pricing for domestic shares.15  
However, the most rigorous empirical work in the area of microeco-
nomic effects of capital controls has focused at the country level on the two 
most famous users of controls, Chile and Malaysia, and these lessons merit a 
closer look below. Additionally, given the size of its economy and its exten-
sive array of controls, China also deserves to be examined; while scholarship 
is fledgling on the effects of capital controls on entrepreneurship in China, 
the work that has been done offers an excellent glimpse into issues that all 
emerging markets may face in this area.
13/  Ibid.
14/  Brown, Ongena, and Yesin (2009).
15/  Stigler, Shaw, and Patnaik (2010).
the Chilean encaje
Perhaps more than any other country, Chile is repeatedly invoked as the model 
of getting controls right. While many developing countries feared the drastic 
effects of sudden capital outflows (with the effects of the debt crisis of 1982 
still prominent in policymakers’ minds), Chile’s restrictions were focused on 
moderating inflows. Starting in 1991 and lasting until 1998, Chile’s encaje 
(meaning “strongbox” in Spanish) was a series of capital account restrictions 
originally utilized as a way to control exchange rate pressures, as, perhaps 
ironically, liberalization in the Chilean economy in the early 1990s led to capi-
tal inflows that in turn led to a steadily appreciation of the peso. The center-
piece of the encaje was an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) that 
required a fraction (at first, 20%) of portfolio inflows to be deposited at the 
Central Bank for a fixed term in a non-interest bearing account.16  Additional-
ly, seemingly to favor longer-maturity capital, the requirement (made in 1982) 
that direct investment must remain in-country for 10 years was reduced to 3 
years in 1991. As Neely (1999) notes, the restrictions served to lower the rate 
of return of portfolio investments, and thus dampen inflows at the margin that 
were seeking to take advantage of the interest rate differentials between Chile 
and other developed nations (notably the United States).
How well did these controls work to reach the policy goals set out by 
the Chilean government? There is a notable lack of clear-cut evidence on the 
benefits of the controls; according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Professor Kristin J. Forbes, most of the economic analyses of Chile’s 
restrictions “conclude that the capital controls shifted the composition of capi-
tal inflows to a longer maturity and provided a small increase in monetary 
policy flexibility, but had minimal effect on other variables (such as the total 
volume of capital inflows or exchange rate).” 17 Perhaps more importantly, 
the evidence is solidly against the controls’ effect on exchange rate apprecia-
tion (the original justification for the controls), as several authors note that the 
exchange rate continued its appreciation, rising 28 percent over the period of 
capital controls. 
Although it is often claimed that the encaje was able to minimize the 
negative consequences of controls, the restrictions did not come without a 
cost to Chile. The administration of the controls took a lot of time and effort 
16/  As Thin (2009) notes, the deposit requirement fluctuated between 10 and 30% and penalties for withdrawal 
between 1-3%, as policymakers continually attempted to fine-tune and “close loopholes.”
17/  Forbes (2003), p. 1. Even the evidence that longer-term maturities were encouraged is disputed, however, as 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data shows that, during the time of the URR, short-term debt in Chile 
actually increased; see the IMF’s Joshua Feldman’s presentation from 2007, where he examined the effects of the 
controls.
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from the government, especially as the private sector continued to find ways to 
evade them (a key factor behind the rise in the URR from 20% to 30% in 1992 
and the requirement instituted in 1995 that all URRs had to be deposited in 
US dollars, raising their real cost). Perhaps most importantly, both Forbes and 
Gallego and Hernandez (2003) found that the encaje  substantially increased 
the cost of financing for smaller Chilean firms, with Forbes performing an 
analysis that shows in 1996-97, larger firms had investment costs of 7-8% on 
average, while small firms had costs of over 20%. While smaller firms typi-
cally face higher lending costs, the controls exacerbated their plight by creat-
ing a pool of longer maturity investment (harder for small firms to access) and 
increased scrutiny for banks (which smaller firms rely on more heavily than 
larger firms). Further econometric evidence from Forbes notes that “there is 
no evidence of financial constraints for either smaller or large firms for the 
period after the encaje was lifted, nor any evidence of a significant relationship 
between firm size and financial constraints.”18  While at the macro level Chile 
may not have suffered as a result of its capital controls, there definitely were 
losers after the imposition of the encaje.
Malaysia and the asian Crisis
Malaysia in 1998 is the case offered second only to Chile as the exemplar of 
the beneficial nature of capital controls, and indeed was the case that brought 
serious intellectual debate on controls to the forefront of economic policymak-
ing. While Malaysia had liberalized its capital account beginning in 1968 as 
part of its accession to the IMF, with a slow period of relaxation accelerating in 
1986-87 (although it reintroduced controls temporarily in 1994 to stem the in-
flow of short-term capital, much as in Chile), 19 the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and 
its effects on Malaysia led to the imposition of controls on September 1, 1998. 
Unlike Chile, the Malaysian capital control regime was comprehensive 
and overpowering from the beginning, hoping to perform a financial “shock 
and awe” that would completely insulate the economy from any capital move-
ments. The key pieces of the controls were:
• A fixed exchange rate of 3.8 Malaysian ringgit to the US dollar;
• The ringgit was declared no longer legal tender outside Malaysia;
• Offshore trading in Malaysian shares was banned;
• Repatriation of foreign owned investments was banned for one year;
• All trade settlements had to be made in foreign currency and not in ringgit; 
• Approval was required to transfer capital abroad; and
18/  Forbes (2003), p. 23.
19/  See Johnson et. al (2006) for more information on the progress of Malaysia in liberalizing pre-1992.
• All ringgit assets held abroad had to be repatriated.20 
In a press release from the Central Bank of Malaysia accompanying the 
imposition of controls, monetary authorities noted that the explicit goal of the 
controls was:
i.  “To limit the contagion effects of external developments on the Ma-
laysian economy; 
ii.  To preserve the recent gains made in terms of the policy measures to 
stabilise the domestic economy; and 
iii.  To ensure stability in domestic prices and the ringgit exchange rate 
and create an environment that is conducive for a revival in investor 
and consumer confidence and facilitate economic recovery.”21 
As with Chile, Malaysia’s controls also had an impact on firms within the 
country, albeit in a different manner than under the encaje. On the positive 
(or, more accurately, neutral) side, IMF researchers noted that, while “there is 
no evidence in the data to suggest that capital controls made a visible differ-
ence in Malaysia’s recovery process… at the same time, there is no evidence 
that controls had lasting costs through affecting Malaysia’s access to interna-
tional portfolio capital.” 22 From the standpoint of foreign investors, Malay-
sia remained an attractive destination for investment (due mainly to its better 
governance), although FDI did decline relative to other Asian countries and 
Malaysia’s own prior performance.
 Counterbalanced against this macro assertion were tangible effects at the 
micro level. One of the charges leveled against Malaysia and, indeed, one of 
the alleged causes of its economic problems was “crony capitalism,” or the 
fact that several firms within the country appeared to benefit from govern-
ment largess to the exclusion of others. Research from Johnson et. al (2006) 
and Mitchell and Joseph (2010) found that government-owned firms or firms 
that were publicly tied in some way with the rulers (specifically Prime Min-
ister Mahathir Mohammad) both benefited more from the capital controls (in 
terms of their stock returns) and were harmed more by their removal. 23 While 
some authors have argued that politically-connected firms weren’t helped ex-
clusively (Cozzi and Nissanke (2009) claim that, because currency stability 
20/  This list is based on work done by Mitchell and Joseph (2010), who elaborate on many of the restrictions 
imposed by Malaysia.
21/  The press release by Bank Negara Malaysia was entitled “Measures to Regain Monetary Independence,” 
although this is only at best given as a peripheral reason. The release is still available on-line at: http://www.bnm.
gov.my/index.php?ch=8&pg=14&ac=482&print=1.
22/  Johnson et. al (2006).
23/  Mitchell and Joseph also make the point that government-owned firms already tended to be larger than the 
average Malaysian firm, which could also point to less of a need for foreign capital; hence, a willingness to support 
controls.
14 Capital Controls and the MaCroeConoMiC deterMinants of entrepreneurship in eMerging Markets 15CApITAL CONTROLS AND ENTREpRENEuRShIp: ThEORy AND EVIDENCE/ SIEMS ISSuE REpORT
was enforced under the controls, all industries in the tradable sector benefited), 
the evidence shows that being politically-connected eased the burden of capi-
tal controls, while not having connections led to poorer performance and the 
problems with financing one would expect with restrictions.24 
China and the future
In contrast to Chile and Malaysia, China’s experience with capital controls dif-
fers in that it has never had a really “open” capital account, instead instituting a 
complex series of controls that have only very gradually (and recently) moved 
towards liberalization. Thus, in terms of their effect on entrepreneurship, there 
really isn’t a “before” and “after” that can be examined, and counterfactuals 
are more theoretical than empirical. Despite this limitation, however, several 
studies have attempted to study entrepreneurship in China, making reference 
to the business environment that firms face, including the presence of capital 
controls.
A key component of Chinese capital controls that can have an effect 
on entrepreneurship relates to domestic financial repression, as state-owned 
banks hold an effective monopoly on funds, and thus have a great say in who 
receives financing and who doesn’t. The result of this political allocation of 
financing in China has been an interesting inversion of an argument made 
by some proponents of capital controls; recall above that many authors have 
claimed that liberalization of capital flows would advantage foreign firms over 
domestic ones, leading to crowding out of domestic entrepreneurs. In China, 
the “crowding-out” effect has been seen, but the winners are state-owned firms 
and the cause has not been liberalization, it has been a direct result of the con-
trols. Simply put, political considerations from the ruling Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) favor state-owned firms for financing, leading to a weakening 
of entrepreneurship from Chinese firms. In the words of researcher Yasheng 
Huang, there is “a systematic, pervasive, persistent bias in financial policies 
in favor of the least efficient firms in the Chinese economy—[state-owned 
enterprises or] SOEs—at the expense of the most efficient firms,” specifically 
“China’s small, entrepreneurial, and private enterprises.”25  This effect has 
been identified by entrepreneurs themselves as a binding constraint on obtain-
ing finance: in the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey from 1999-2000, covering 
24/  Cozzi and Nissanke (2005:2) also note a more discriminatory reason for the capital controls: “Interviews 
conducted with Malaysian government officials also suggest that the imposition of capital controls enabled them 
to continue implementing affirmative pro-Malay policies without external interference and maintain the domestic 
ownership of Malaysian firms.” Thus, the controls actually were designed to harm the prospects of some firms for 
the benefit of others.
25/  See Huang (2005).
a sample of entrepreneurial firms in the non-state sector in China, 66.3% of 
the firms polled considered financing constraints to be a “major obstacle.”26 As 
the World Bank has noted, the political control of credit has led to “poor per-
formance of the banking sector” and stifled innovation as, “with high barriers 
of entry and exit, new ideas and new capabilities regarding bank management, 
products and market reach cannot prevail.”27
Beyond financing constraints, the full effect that controls will have on 
Chinese firms may not be known until the controls are lifted. A paper from 
Sweden attempts to forecast the results of that eventuality, predicting that 
when China lifts its array of capital controls, Chinese firms will be severely 
disadvantaged by their lack of exposure to and knowledge of the global econo-
my.28 This performance will most likely be exacerbated (and highlighted) by 
the differences between mainland Chinese firms and firms from Hong Kong, 
where firms have had a longer exposure to international competition and, more 
importantly, the former colony has fostered entrepreneurship via appropriate 
investment climate policies. This has been reflected in the entry density of 
firms (newly registered corporations per 1,000 working-age people) in Hong 
Kong vis a vis most of the world: compared with China, which has an entry 
density estimated by the World Bank at less than 1 new firm per 1,000 people, 
Hong Kong has consistently had entry densities over 10 (with it actually in-
creasing during the global financial crisis to a high of 19 (19 firms per 1,000 
people in 2009). Clearly, some of the same issues seen in Malaysia and Chile 
in regards to their capital controls and their effects on entrepreneurs seem to 
happening in today’s China as well.
26/  Referenced in Dorn (2006).
27/  Bai (2006).
28/  Oxelheim (2008).   
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As noted in the previous section, cross-country evidence on the effects of fi-
nancial controls and entrepreneurship has basically been limited to one im-
portant study from Harvard, with the bulk of the work concentrating on mac-
roeconomic effects of controls and country-specific studies. This section will 
attempt to rectify this macro-bias and present new evidence on the effects of 
capital controls on entrepreneurship from a cross-country perspective, includ-
ing examining the effect of controls during the global financial crisis. This 
approach will hopefully lend a new dimension to the still-raging debate on the 
use of capital controls.  
data and Methodology
While prior research noted in Section I has confirmed some of the theoretical 
negative effects of controls on firm entry, for the most part they end before the 
global financial crisis began. This paper will seek to extend the analysis done 
in Alfaro and Charlton (2008) and see if there is a continued (or even stronger) 
relationship between controls and firm entry during the GFC.
The data on firm entry to be used in this paper comes from the World Bank 
Group’s Entrepreneurship Snapshots database, which contains data on firm 
entry for 112 developing and industrialized countries from 2004-09.29 The key 
indicator that the database compiles is “entry density,” defined as the number 
of newly registered corporations per 1,000 working-age people (aged between 
15 and 64). This weighted indicator of firm entry takes into account differing 
population sizes of countries (it would be pointless to compare number of new 
firms in India versus Bhutan, due to their enormously different size), while 
also scaling appropriately for the size of a country’s labor force. Thus, entry 
density will be the dependent variable we are seeking to explain, focusing on 
the effects of capital controls on entry density.
One issue that has been noted by other researchers is the difficulty of 
measuring capital controls in an empirical sense. As IMF staff have noted, 
“finding a significant link between capital controls and economic outcomes 
is made difficult also by the fact that some of the most widely used capital 
controls indicators are crude, binary indicators which ignore variations in the 
degree of capital account restrictiveness.”30 To avoid this problem, this paper 
utilizes an indicator that has become somewhat standard in the literature, the 
Chinn-Ito indicator of financial openness. This indicator, detailed in Chinn 
29/  Alfaro and Charlton (2008) use a much more comprehensive database on company details, the Dun & Brad-
street WorldBase. However, the World Bank database provides data from the policymakers’ point of view (taken 
from company registries), and its emphasis on firm entry rather than operations makes it a suitable substitute in 
this paper.
30/  Prati, Schindler, and Valenzuela (2009).
and Ito (2007) is constructed as the first standardized principal component of 
four separate variables for a country taken from the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER):
• the presence of multiple exchange rates;
• restrictions on current account transactions;
• the share of a five-year window (encompassing year t and the preceding 
four years) that capital controls were not in effect; and
• the presence of a requirement to surrender of export proceeds.
This index takes on higher values the more open the country is to cross-
border capital transactions, and the latest version of the index covers 182 
countries from 1970 through 2008. The use of the Chinn-Ito indicator distin-
guishes this study from the Alfaro and Charlton analysis, which uses the aver-
age of the AREAER indicators as the measure of capital control restrictions 
for each country. By utilizing the Chinn-Ito indicator, we hope to show more 
“economic” content in terms of restrictions beyond a simple averaging.
As controls for the capital openness indicator, this paper will utilize a simi-
lar approach as Alfaro and Charlton (2008) and also examine the effects of the 
level of GDP per capita (in thousands of US constant dollars, to proxy for a 
country’s development level), GDP growth (to proxy for current economic ac-
tivity), the level of GDP (in billions of US constant dollars, to capture scale ef-
fects from larger markets), the extent of domestic credit to the private sector (as 
% of GDP), and a series of variables on institutions. The institutional variables 
come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and, as in the HBS 
paper, include rankings on corruption, bureaucratic quality, and law and order; 
these variables are presumably important in the decision of an entrepreneur to 
start a business or not. These variables are coded from 1 to 6, with 6 being the 
highest quality, most law and order, or least corruption. Unlike the earlier paper, 
however, we will utilize the change in these institutional variables (rather than 
their level) to see how institutional change affected firm entry. 31 
results
Table 3 shows the results of several combinations of variables in order to as-
certain the effect of capital controls on firm entry (a more detailed explanation 
of the methods utilized are shown in the Technical Appendix). The first column 
31/  The econometric reason for using change rather than levels is explained in the technical appendix. Addition-
ally, while Alfaro and Charlton use log transformations for their GDP variables, this approach is eschewed here for 
two reasons. The first is that we are not interested in elasticities as much as the direction of effect. The second and 
more important concerns the stationarity tests shown in the technical appendix: in order to remove the unit root 
from some of the GDP variables, differencing would have to be used. However, differencing the logs of the GDP 
level variable would make it identical to the GDP growth rate, meaning a duplication of variables and multicol-
linearity. Thus, GDP per capita and GDP are used at their levels but differenced to remove the unit root.
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shows the entire model, with all variables included; of these variables in this 
specification, only GDP growth rate and capital openness enter as significant 
explanators for entry density, with capital account openness being the most sig-
nificant both statistically and economically.  The lack of significance of the insti-
tutional variables do not necessarily mean a lack of correlation between institu-
tions and firm entry; rather, it signifies that over this time period and across all 
countries, changes in institutions were less of a factor in determining the number 
of firms per capita entering the marketplace. This could be due to many reasons, 
including the shorter time-span of this database and the fact that institutional 
variables change very slowly (and even if they do change it make take time for 
expectations to change and their effects to filter through the economy). 
While level of GDP per capita is used in the HBS paper to proxy for develop-
ment, it may be easier to simply separate out countries that are “emerging mar-
kets” and re-run the model using only these countries (the level of GDP per capita 
is retained to show the difference in development levels amongst emerging mar-
kets). The second column of Table 3 shows the result of the analysis including only 
emerging market countries, and the results shift somewhat; while the magnitude of 
the effect is slightly smaller, capital account openness is the most significant vari-
able statistically in determining the entry density of firms in a specific developing 
country, while domestic credit enters at marginal significance. 
However, given that the institutional variables appear to be less of a factor 
than capital openness and GDP growth (across all countries) or domestic cred-
it (for emerging markets), we will next employ an approach popularized by 
Hendry (1995): the “general to specific” approach. This method involves nar-
rowing down a model to its most parsimonious form via an iterative process, 
leaving us with only the most important variables within the current model 
framework (there is always a danger of omitting variables in any model, thus 
results must be treated with the standard modicum of caution). Using this ap-
proach, we see in column 3 of Table 3 that the most important variables for 
firm entry across all countries remains capital account openness, while GDP 
growth loses its significance; this may signify that firms start in good times 
and bad, but it is the availability of capital rather than a momentum effect that 
actually determines if a firm is started or not. More interestingly, this approach 
isolates an institutional effect heretofore not captured, and changes in law and 
order enter into the equation significantly and negatively. This negative rela-
tionship may perhaps proxy for government size, for as a country increases 
its level of law and order, it most likely also generates a larger bureaucracy to 
deal with it; thus, more law and order can discourage entrepreneurs, who shy 
away from large amounts of red tape. 
As a final check, the “general to specific” approach was also utilized on 
the sub-set of emerging market economies, shown in Column 4 of Table 3. 
GDP per capita now enters the equation as significant and positive, signifying 
perhaps that differences amongst development levels within emerging markets 
also influence entrepreneurship (and that perhaps there is a threshold level of 
development that is more conducive to firm creation). Law and order is not 
significant in this sub-group, lending more credence to the theory that higher 
levels of law and order may correlate with more bureaucracy. Finally, as in the 
earlier regressions, domestic credit and capital openness remain highly statis-
tically significant for firm entry. These results once again suggest that capital 
controls do indeed place a capital constraint on firms in emerging markets that 
they are not able to fill domestically, and foreign capital allows more firms to 
enter the market.
TAbLE 3/  RESuLTS OF ThE ANALySIS, ENTRy DENSITy VS. 
CApITAL OpENNESS AND CONTROLS
Regression
Variable 1 2 3 4
Δ GDP 0.006 -0.010
0.79 0.59
Δ GDP per capita -0.160 2.70 2.05
0.39 1.43 1.99*
GDP growth rate 0.04 -0.02
2.49* 0.53
Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 0.03 0.06 0.06
1.51 2.00* 2.21*
Δ Bureaucratic Quality 0.78 0.50
1.44 0.88
Δ Law and Order -0.32 -0.14 -0.48
1.47 0.55 2.43*
Corruption -0.03 0.04
0.17 0.17
Capital Openness 0.73 0.53 0.91 0.52
2.55* 2.75** 2.72** 2.51*
Constant 0.79 -1.17 2.50
0.53 0.74 6.52**
N 287 234 362 267
R-squared 0.32 0.25 0.12 0.27
Absolute values of t-statistics are under the coefficients. * denotes significance at the 10% level, while ** 
denotes significance at the 1% level.
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“China has had capital controls on short-term flows that have worked, not per-
fectly, but have worked to stabilize these short-term flows. But at the same time, 
it’s been very open to long-term investments… where I do have a worry is coun-
tries like India, where they are debating how much intervention in the market we 
should have. And there are people who say in India we shouldn’t have capital 
controls, even though Brazil’s done it, China’s done it.”32
 Joseph Stiglitz 
While capital controls may afford a government some “breathing space” for 
its macroeconomic policies, an ever-growing body of evidence has shown that 
capital controls have a real and enduring cost for the real economy in coun-
tries that enact them, especially at the microeconomic level. This paper has 
built upon both country-specific and cross-country studies from the literature, 
extending the analysis to include the first year of the global financial crisis, 
finding that countries with more open capital accounts fared better in terms 
of entrepreneurship than those that closed up tight. This result holds for both 
developed and emerging market economies over the period 2004-08, with firm 
entry strongly influenced by economic activity, domestic credit availability 
(for emerging markets), and the availability of foreign capital.  
Of course, this analysis has been far-from-comprehensive, as there are 
many determinants of entrepreneurship in a country beyond mere macro-
economic and (formal) institutional variables. Culture, societal attitudes and 
obligations, and other micro issues (such as industry exigencies or competi-
tive environment) can all influence the individual’s decision to start their own 
business. However, the results of this paper show that while the desire to open 
a business may differ from country-to-country, actually opening a business 
successfully is tempered by its ease. Capital controls simply make it harder for 
businesses to start by restricting available capital, as well as engendering other 
distortions (including bureaucracy) that are correlated with low firm creation 
(as shown in the full sample model in Table 3).
In this sense, capital account openness may be indicative of other issues 
with a government’s entrepreneurial policies, as very rarely are controls in-
stituted by a government that has been non-interventionist in the past. More 
likely, a country that institutes capital controls has also committed to other 
policies and regulations that can harm entrepreneurs, whether through admin-
istrative barriers to starting a business or policy decisions regarding exchange 
rates or international trade. Capital account openness can thus be taken as a 
32/  Quoted in “Stiglitz Urges Capital Controls to Curb ‘Hot Money’,” November 11, 2010, available on-line at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/11/us-stiglitz-idUSTRE6AA15Z20101111.
proxy for a government’s general attitude towards business and the proper role 
of government in an economy.
Seen through this lens, enacting capital controls may be the worst remedy 
for governments seeking to pull their country out of a recession and stimulate 
entrepreneurship (indeed, unlike Grabel and Chang’s assertion shown in the 
introduction, it is a debilitating anti-liberal ideology that is doing harm to 
countries and the businesses therein). Rather than focusing on building bar-
riers, governments should play the role of facilitator, encouraging entrepre-
neurship across a broad variety of fronts; while traditional innovation policy, 
including support of innovation centers and incubators, investment in R&D, 
and support for education and human capital development, can yield targeted 
dividends, attention must also be paid to investment climate issues such as 
capital openness. Concentrating on getting the macroeconomic fundamentals 
right will encourage stability and create an environment that will allow entre-
preneurs to realize their plans.
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Technical appendix
This Appendix will delve more fully into the technical aspects of the model 
utilized in Section II. 
Regarding the underlying data, a crucial issue that was not included in the ear-
lier Alfaro and Charlton (2008) work was a test of the stationarity of data. In par-
ticular, GDP levels and GDP per capita are notorious for having a unit root; that is, 
for exhibiting an upward drift over time, thus leading to spurious regression results 
if they are included at their levels. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Tables A.1 
and A.2) confirms that, in this database, both GDP at its level and GDP per capita 
are non-stationary: the statistics reported have a null hypothesis that all panels con-
tain unit roots, which cannot be rejected in either case). Thus, the variables must 
be differenced in order to remove the unit root (not shown are the results of the 
first differencing, which confirms that the two series are integrated of order I(1)). 
 A similar exercise is undertaken on the ICRG variables, which also have a 
tendency towards non-stationarity due to their bounding and, for the most part, 
time trends. While this database is over a smaller period of time, and thus we 
would expect non-stationarity to be less of a problem, a similar test (Table A.3) 
shows that both bureaucratic quality and law and order exhibit a unit root and must 
also be differenced (corruption is stationary at its level and can be retained as is).
Finally, the appropriate econometric method to analyze the data was cho-
sen as a fixed effects model (rather than random effects) utilizing a generalized 
least squares estimator. In cross-country, cross-time datasets such as this, it 
is common to utilize a fixed-effects model, and the results of a Hausman test 
performed on the two variations showed a significant difference between the 
two specifications (results reported in Table A.4 below, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not systematic). 
Given these econometric issues, the full model utilized in the regression 
shown in Table 3, Column 1 considers entry density as a function of both mac-
roeconomic variables and institutional impediments:
EDit= α∆GDPit+β∆GDP per capitait+ γGDP growthit+ δDomesticCreditit+ 
θ∆Bureaucratic Qualityit+ υ∆Law and Orderit+ ρCorruptionit+ σCapital 
Account Openessit+ μ+εit
In this specification, μ represents the fixed effect. Additionally, robust 
standard errors were utilized, to correct for possible heteroskedasticity arising 
from the time-series data.
TAbLE A.1/ uNIT ROOT TEST FOR GDp
GDp level Statistic p-value
Inverse chi-squared(202) P 128.728 1.0000
Inverse normal Z 3.8458 0.9999
Inverse logit (484) L* 4.1804 1.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm -3.6454 0.9999
TAbLE A.2/  uNIT ROOT TEST FOR GDp pER CApITA
GDp per capita Statistic p-value
Inverse chi-squared(202) P 151.07 0.9970
Inverse normal Z 3.6785 0.9999
Inverse logit (494) L* 4.1087 1.0000
Modified inv. Chi-squared Pm -2.5341 0.9944
Obtained using STATA 11, command xtunitroot fisher [varname], dfuller, with 
zero lags
TAbLE A.3/ uNIT ROOT TESTS FOR INSTITuTIONAL 
VARIAbLES
Bureaucratic 
Quality
Law and order Corruption
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Inverse chi-
squared
P 72.388 1 142.094 0.978 340.802 0
Inverse normal Z -1.575 0.058 -2.892 0.002 -2.913 0.002
Inverse logit L* -7.643 0 -6.307 0 -11.214 0
Modified inv.  
Chi-squared
Pm -5.672 1 -1.903 0.972 8.629 0
Obtained using STATA 11, command xtunitroot, fisher [varname] dfuller, with 
zero lags
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Finally, the application of the “general to specific” model was utilized 
through stepwise elimination of the least significant variable in the preceding 
regression. F-scores were then compared for goodness of fit of the successive 
models until only significant variables were left within this model. As noted in 
the main text, the danger in this approach comes through omitted variable bias, 
which has somewhat been corrected for through use of robust standard errors. 
However, more research is called for to create a complete model of firm entry.
TAbLE A.4/  hAuSMAN TEST RESuLTS, FE V. RE FOR FuLL 
MODEL
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B))
fixed random Difference S.E.
D.GDp 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.001
D.GDpcap -0.16 0.008 -0.168 0.081
GDp_Grow 0.04 0.039 0.001 0.010
Domestic 
Credit
0.027 0.035 -0.008 0.006
D.BurQual 0.778 0.59 0.188 0.108
D.Laworder -0.324 -0.282 -0.042 0.042
Corruption -0.034 0.458 -0.492 0.243
KAopen 0.732 0.677 0.055 0.189
chi2(7) 18.56
Prob>chi2 0.017
Obtained using STATA 11, command hausman on stored estimates from RE 
and FE regressions
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The Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO is a joint project of 
Russian and international business representatives, who joined their 
efforts to create a business new-generation school from scratch. Fo-
cusing on practical knowledge, the Moscow School of Management 
dedicates itself to training leaders, who intend to implement their pro-
fessional knowledge in the conditions of rapidly developing markets. 
SKOLKOVO is defined by: leadership and business undertakings, rap-
idly developing markets focus, innovative approach towards educa-
tional methods.
The Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO project is fulfilled 
by the governmental-private partnership within the framework of the 
Education Foreground National project. The project is financed by pri-
vate investors, and doesn’t use governmental budget recourses. The 
president of the Russian Federation Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev is 
Chairman of the SKOLKOVO International Advisory board.
Since 2006 SKOLKOVO conducts short educational Executive Edu-
cation programmes for top and medium level managers – open pro-
grammes and specialized, integrated modules based on the com-
panies requests. SKOLKOVO launched Executive МВА programme 
in January 2009, first class of the international Full-time MbA pro-
gramme – in September 2009.
Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO
100 ulitsa Novaya, Skolkovo,
Odintsovsky district, Moscow Region,
Russia 143025
tel.: +7 495 580 30 03
fax: +7 495 994 46 68
The SKOLKOVO institute for Emerging Market studies (SIEMS) is a 
knowledge centre at the Moscow School of Management SKOLKOVO 
that specializes in the research of the economies and businesses of 
the emerging markets. It provides a research platform that attracts and 
links leading thinkers and experts from around the world, who can col-
laborate on studying timely and critical issues in emerging markets. Its 
research is rigorous, field-driven, and comparative across emerging 
markets and offers practical, broadly applicable, and valuable guide-
lines and frameworks for business leaders, entrepreneurs, policy-mak-
ers, and academics with interests in emerging markets. It currently 
has offices in Moscow and beijing and plans to open the India office 
in the near future. Its researchers include several full-time and part-
time research fellows who are leading scholars and experts in various 
fields. Its current research focus covers economic and financial devel-
opment, firm growth and sustainability, CSR practices, and indigenous 
innovations in fast growing countries. Its research output is distributed 
through various forms of reports, publications, forums, and seminars. 
we welcome feedback and suggestions from our readers on the re-
search findings and future research directions.
SKOLKOVO Institute for Emerging Market Studies
unit 1607-1608, North Star Times Tower  
No. 8 beichendong Road, Chaoyang District
beijing, 100101, China
tel./fax: +86 10 6498 1634
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Ernst & young is a global leader in assurance, tax, transaction and 
advisory services. worldwide, our 144,000 people are united by our 
shared values and an unwavering commitment to quality. we make a 
difference by helping our people, our clients and our wider communi-
ties achieve their potential. 
with the opening of our Moscow office in 1989, we were the first pro-
fessional services firm to establish operations in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. Ernst & young expands its services and re-
sources in accordance with clients’ needs throughout the CIS. 3,400 
professionals work at 16 offices throughout the CIS in Moscow, St. 
petersburg, Novosibirsk, Ekaterinburg, Togliatti, yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 
Almaty, Astana, Atyrau, baku, Kyiv, Donetsk, Tashkent, Tbilisi, yere-
van, and Minsk.
Across all industries, and at local and international levels, our profes-
sionals are recognized for their leadership, know-how, and delivery of 
accomplished results. we aim to help you identify and reduce business 
risks, find solutions that will work, and open new opportunities for your 
company. Through more than 20 years of our operations in the CIS, 
we have provided the critical information and the trusted resources to 
pave the way for improved business performance and profitability. 
Ernst & young 
Sadovnicheskaya Nab. 77, bld. 1 | 115035 Moscow | Russia 
phone: +7 (495) 755 9700 
Fax: +7 (495) 755 9701 
E-mail: moscow@ru.ey.com 
website: www.ey.com
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